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How interdependent are the sciences and humanities? In this article I trace, in broad 
terms, a scientifically-grounded narrative that culminates in a world we describe using 
the humanities, and my field, literary studies, in particular. The longstanding 
presumption that science sits opposed to the humanities is fostered on both sides, to 
neither’s benefit. I hope that by describing something of the bilateral relationship 
between these fields, arguing that they may be points on a web rather than discrete 
disciplines, we might better appreciate their places in a cultural ecosystem of 
interdependence. My hope is that scholars in both the sciences and the humanities 
appreciate better what one offers the other. 
 Several scholars have pondered upon the role of the humanities recently. Helen 
Small reviewed arguments that arose in the nineteenth century from Jeremy Bentham 
and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, via John Stuart Mill, and from Matthew Arnold, among 
others. Jonathan Bate’s collection of essays by various humanities scholars perhaps 
shows even more awareness of the pressure on the academy to justify its receipt of 
public funds, again on cost-benefit principles. Stefan Collini (What Are Universities 
For?) and Martha Nussbaum have weighed in on similar terms. My own position is 
largely sympathetic to all of these: Small’s is a historically well-informed discussion of 
the kinds of value that may not be pecuniary, but which are socially significant 
nonetheless; Nussbaum repudiates the demand for economic value in and of itself, 
though this may be preaching to the choir, rather than those actually in charge of 
funding the choir; Bate’s various essayists are likewise persuasive, but many of their 
essays read to me like research proposals to funding bodies, anxious to trumpet past 
financial returns from research into archaeology, classical studies and theology, with 
the promise of more if funding continues (the principal object of gratitude in that 
volume’s acknowledgements is the United Kingdom’s Arts and Humanities Research 
Council). Unlike the essayists in Bate’s collection, I do not feel I can make much of a 
case for enhanced, or even continued, public funding. But if their arguments rest on the 
observation that the benefits of humanities research are often entirely unpredictable at 
the point of departure – which I would observe is also true of some of the most 
significant scientific research – then highlighting some of the unexpected consequences 
of language as an adaptive characteristic, challenging some of the ways that language 
is routinely taken for granted in our disciplines, might raise the idea of its value more 
widely, validating its continued study as a driver towards social good. 
 This article emerges from discussions I have had over the years with English 
students at Cambridge, recounting their experiences of the flurry of introductions that 
constitute Freshers’ Week, where they so often face demands from students taking 
STEM subjects to justify the academic value of English. After an exhausting series of 
evenings being tormented by, say, one of the new intake of engineers, who has pointed 
out that the raw study of poetry has little saleable value in the marketplace, that all 
degrees encourage critical thinking and how to write; that they read books too, only in 
their leisure time, after they have finished their studies – at this point I propose to my 
weary students that they abandon the defensive mode and strike up a stealth attack, 
beginning with a question – “You’ve heard of Charles Darwin?” (Because if my English 
students are going to be patronized, they may as well give a taste of it back.) Anyway, 
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assuming our engineer splutters back “Of course!”, the next question he faces is, “Do 
you know what Darwin considered humankind’s second greatest achievement?” And 
maybe he will, but that is unimportant: the actual answer (which is the control of fire) 
is not the point. The point of this loaded question is to prompt him to demand what it 
was Darwin considered to be humankind’s greatest achievement. “Oh,” my student will 
reply nonchalantly. “The evolution of language” (Darwin, 1:137). 
 Controlling fire provided the survival essentials and evolutionary drivers of 
security, socialization, cooked food, an energy source that is not human muscle, and the 
only pathway to advanced technology. Language, however, is the critical means of 
managing its power, passing crucial information across huge distances and between 
generations, organizing and maintaining large social groups, and securing advantage 
while lowering the risk of self-destructive violence. Darwin knew that language was an 
evolutionary adaptation, and we all know that human language exceeds anything like it 
elsewhere in the animal kingdom. The aim of my examination into how language 
emerged concomitantly with social and technological adaptations is to throw some 
additional light on the interdependence between the sciences and humanities. Within 
the aims of the ScienceHumanities more broadly, I propose that this interdependence is 
not only mutual, but that it has been so throughout history, and that both our social and 
technological progress would never have evolved without it being so. 
 I should say in advance that I do not know how advanced language evolved 
among the Homo species. The surviving palaeontological and archaeological evidence 
is too fragmentary, and narratives based upon it require a lot of imaginative gap-filling, 
about which no-one fully agrees. But I will adopt certain positions about it from among 
current thinking, supported by evidence, which I hope will not be too controversial. The 
first is that language is an evolved human characteristic. We cannot remotely assume it 
has always been part of us, nor that we developed it because we chose to. Like the 
peacock’s tail, language was always far too extravagant a luxury to have evolved 
without returning significant evolutionary advantages. 
 The second point, slightly more contentious among linguists, is that the 
evolution of language was gradual rather than sudden, that its origins more likely 
emerged at least in rudimentary form in australopithecines (c.3 million years ago 
(3mya)) and Homo habilis (c.2mya), and evolved as the various species of Homo 
evolved, rather than, as some Chomskyans claim, as a sudden process some time in the 
early emergence of Homo sapiens (c.200-300,000 years ago (200-300kya)). The third, 
more in agreement with the Chomskyans, is that language ability is largely innate rather 
than learned from scratch by every human child (Pinker Language Instinct, 21-24). But 
these are, as I say, adoptive positions, and neither scientists nor linguists (which I am 
not) are settled on them. That may be an advantage of being a humanities scholar: to 
work comfortably with the balance of probabilities rather than empirical certainty. 
 I will begin by proposing that human language is like colour vision or gripping 
hands: the refinement of some survival/reproductive adaptation that has taken on 
functions beyond its original reason for evolving. Biologists call a feature that takes on 
a function for which it did not originally evolve “exaptive”. Birds’ feathers, which 
evolved not for flight but for some function such as temperature control or courtship 
display, are the classic example of exaptation – flight is a relatively recent adaptation, 
yet this conversion of feathers’ function would have been evolutionarily impossible 
unless feathers were well established features of flying birds’ ancestors. Our thumbs 
are another example. Thumbs are useful, for sending text messages or playing on game 
consoles, or hitchhiking, but we could not possibly have evolved gripping hands 
because of a future wish to do these things. We have gripping hands because our 
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ancestors once needed to be secure and mobile in treetops; the unparalleled fine motor 
skills that distinguishes H sapiens from other hominids arose from the survival and 
reproductive advantages conferred by the manufacture of precision tools. Complex 
language likewise evolved to fulfil different functions from how it is used today. To 
anyone with minimal knowledge of evolution these facts ought to be obvious, though 
even then, according to Dutch primatologist Frans de Waal, assumptions about the pre-
eminence of human uniqueness, including but not limited to language ability, are pretty 
common even among scientists (de Waal 157-58, 187-88). Among non-linguist 
humanities and literary scholars, human language ability as a given quantity seems all 
but taken for granted. We talk a lot about how language shapes ideology, which of 
course it does, but this has set aside the ways in which language evolved as a responsive 
adaptation to environmental pressures, and how, since then, environmental pressures 
exerted by changes in technology, polity and scientific thinking, allowed language to 
move into new spaces for which it did not originally evolve, just as thumbs did. 
 I am aware that this recasts society and ideology as environmental pressures – 
this is deliberate. Refocussing on ecological contexts recalls the role played by language 
in human social development. It enhances our understanding of the interplay between 
language and environment. We cannot quite give up our addiction to the problems of 
genius, or of Whiggish intent, when these are actually post hoc judgments after some 
new way of doing things or of seeing the world seems preferable to what went before. 
Examples might include the discovery of perspective, or narrative forms, or even 
evolutionary theory itself. But such new ways of seeing are generally not consciously 
aimed at eliminating an old way of seeing the world, any more than the point of CDs 
was to make vinyl records obsolete. Behavioural ecologists study the means by which 
environmental pressures create selective adaptations that ultimately embed in species 
as behaviours, and I doubt many biologists would claim that advanced language ability 
was merely an agreeable add-on to a reasonably bright primate. As humanities scholars 
we are often inclined to start our arguments from the position of language as a given: 
like feathers and thumbs, language always seems to have done what it is doing now. 
But this is true for none of these. 
 I shall begin by reviewing, then, the idea of language as a uniquely human 
characteristic. It seems strange, in an era where literary scholars increasingly strike 
ecocritical positions towards texts, and are discussing concepts such as the post-human, 
that the relationship of human language to the means of and reasons for communication 
among other species does not capture their attention in the same way. Humankind itself, 
including its language ability, is merely another development from ancient ecological 
conditions, after all. Nothing in evolution emerges from nothing, and this includes 
language: our species’ antecedents were not merely similar primates whose more 
complex communication was primarily through actions and gestures – we think of apes 
grooming, offering their hands in observation of hierarchical positions, and their facial 
expressions. Chimpanzees use limited vocal sounds to pass on information to each other 
about the environment. We know, however, that no chimpanzee can master the complex 
speech mechanisms we have evolved, nor can they ever manage the conceptual 
complexity of human language. This is partly physiological: other primates are 
physically incapable of ever perfecting the fine motor skills needed for breath, mouth 
and tongue control. It is also partly cognitive. Sign-language and symbol-based studies 
– for instance, “Nim Chimpsky”, the subject of James Marsh’s 2011 film Project Nim 
– have observed chimpanzees communicating to the level of a reasonably bright three-
year old human child, but not beyond (Pinker, Language Instinct 335-42). Apes can 
also conceptualize abstractions such as liking, or absence, or feeling sorry. Although 
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there is significant evidence that higher apes experience some of the complex emotional 
responses humans like to think of as their own, such as guilt, a sense of injustice, and 
regret, these are only ever clustered under the blunt abstraction of being bad. But 
primatologists have observed primates exhibiting acts of communication which 
advance their own interests, or those of the group, which while unsophisticated in 
themselves, suggest some of the complex underlying cognitive processes that Homo 
sapiens expresses through more refined means. Behavioural ecologist Brandon 
Wheeler, during fieldwork in Argentina, observed tufted capuchin monkeys competing 
for bananas – a highly prized food – that fieldworkers had left out for them. High-
ranking monkeys gorged freely on the bananas, while low-rankers were kept away. But 
occasionally, low-rankers gave the verbal warning signal for wildcats, causing those 
eating to scatter – even though there was no cat approaching. Low-ranking capuchins 
would then seize the chance to grab temporarily abandoned bananas before their 
deception was realized (Wheeler). Similar acts of deception have been witnessed in 
chimpanzees (de Waal 130-31). Though rudimentary, such episodes demonstrate the 
function of language as both information exchange for the benefit of the group – 
meerkats, dolphins, elephants and bees do this too – and misinformation for the benefit 
of the individual. 
 Humans and capuchins last had a common ancestor about 35mya; humans and 
chimpanzees about 7mya, and a lot has happened on our branch of the split to get us 
where we are. We cannot assume that the behaviour described above would have been 
present in those last common ancestors, but we can see that seven million years down 
the line there are elements of similarity in how and why our related species 
communicate. Merely thinking of primitive language as information exchange, whether 
that communication is vocal, gestural or facial, as the story of the capuchins suggests, 
is to underplay the complexity of non-human language users’ motives. By the time we 
get to the higher primates, communication has subtler, and possibly more nefarious, 
purposes. Which is where we get to Homo sapiens – about 200kya (although see 
Hublin). 
 Further contributory factors in the evolution of human language include early 
hominids’ movement from closed-canopy forests to woodland savannahs, hominins’ 
discovery of root-based sources of stored carbohydrates, a shift to more meat-based 
diets and, argues Richard Wrangham, cooking that meat first (Wrangham & Peterson 
45-48, 52-57; Wrangham 38-44, 95; Herculano-houze 187-98). For Edward Wilson, 
socialization was critical to our primate ancestors because as we relied more on 
intelligence to secure resources we became increasingly weak and vulnerable to our 
predators – high-density calories can be converted to muscle or brain, but not both. The 
safety of numbers protected us; but socialization among intelligent, competitive 
individuals (compare primates with herding, ruminant bovine species) is harder because 
each other individual at close quarters represents another obstacle to one’s own access 
to resources. Social species have to cohere or lose the advantages of being in a group, 
and other individuals are not always easy to get along with (Wilson). Compared to most 
species, including our closest relatives among the great apes, humans are astonishingly 
social. Orang-utans, our most distant cousins among the great apes with a common 
ancestor not less than 10mya, hardly have anything to do with each other, especially 
males. Humans live in tribes and cities and nations, and almost every decision we make 
has a social component, an adaptive distinction from other species we take for granted. 
 The world Wilson describes is one in which early humans, especially once they 
had controlled fire, settled into more socially cohesive groups. Fire appears to have 
been in regular use by humans since around 1.5mya, probably at the hands of H erectus 
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(2mya), and considerably before the emergence of H sapiens, who evolved more than 
a million years later (Wilson 47-48). Fire deflects potential predators, and if you control 
a fire with enough care, it remains static, which keeps a lot of formerly mobile humans 
in one place for a lot longer – the precursor to settlements. Chimpanzees spend many 
hours every day each scouring a wide area for their own food (they also each make a 
new bed every night), and then more hours – up to seven, Wrangham reckons – just 
chewing and digesting the tough, fibrous leaves (Wrangham 138-42). If you cook food 
first, it takes nowhere near the chewing or digestion, and energy is released from it far 
more efficiently, putting longer gaps between meals, all spent around a fire with lots of 
other humans with time on their hands. One cannot imagine why an orang-utan would 
evolve such an absurdly expensive luxury as complex language, for his occasional 
interactions with other members of his species, most of which involve either sex or 
fighting. Humans, on the other hand, developed in increasingly complex social 
environments where selection pressures gave preference to individuals who 
communicated, got on, contributed to the band, worked cooperatively and actively 
ingratiated themselves with others.  
 Evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar proposes that the imperative to get 
along in groups fed into the origins of language by way of grooming. Grooming serves 
as a crucial bonding mechanism between primates, who use it to show affection or 
deference, make peace, form alliances or, when withdrawn, to express displeasure. 
Larger groups required more individuals to keep on good terms, meaning more time 
grooming rather than seeking food. Eating cooked food frees time to spend socializing 
and grooming, but can also create even larger groups to keep happy – and one can only 
groom one individual at a time. Dunbar’s theories are not without their critics, but they 
are most persuasive for me. He argues that over time the soothing coos used by a 
groomer may have extended into a wider meaningful range, becoming verbal grooming. 
Grooming by sound as well as touch meant that more than one ally could be maintained 
simultaneously, and the process could even be simultaneously reciprocated (Dunbar 77-
79). Thus, communicative speech. 
 There is an opening here for particularly gifted communicators, especially if it 
conferred advantageous reproductive rights. Highly developed language skills are 
attractive to most humans, but a lot of what humans say must be taken with caution, 
because the best communicator may also be a crafty manipulator. Time-heavy 
interaction with other humans is the evolutionary trigger behind the evolution of 
language – and if they are not to be left behind, all parties must be very good at all parts: 
speaking, interpreting, and the art of detecting a liar. 
 In his 2014 book Sapiens, Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari charted 
humankind’s ascent to world domination. He argues that what distinguished us from 
variant hominins, and what gave us pre-eminence over them, was our capacity to 
believe things that were not true (Harari 24-25). Examples of such fictions include the 
existence of gods, creation stories, characteristics of a tribe, nation or culture, the value 
of money – any idea around which humans can mobilize for common purposes. 
Chimpanzee troupes in the wild do not exceed 150 individuals, and their organized 
hunting parties number about twenty, all known to each other personally, usually very 
well. But humans organize themselves into hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, 
mostly strangers, united only by their belief in some common purpose – America, 
Christianity, the Olympic Games, human rights, the March for Science – assigned 
arbitrary value by its adherents. Therefore, converting the world into fictions, 
formulating responses to those stories, and sometimes binding ourselves to those stories 
in pursuit of harmony as a social species, has been fundamental to the development of 
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civilization. It may also be the case that many of the stories that bind societies have 
enabled humans to engage in prolonged, large scale wars, crusades, invasions, jihads 
and genocides, but that hardly diminishes the importance we might lay on 
understanding the processes behind narrative, rhetoric, and the formation of myth.  
 There are further relevant corollaries to consider regarding the development of 
language. The focus of English studies is, necessarily, on the written word, and written 
language dates back to around 3200 BCE. That was when Sumerian scribes allocated 
shapes to the phonemes of their spoken language, which they then used consistently to 
inscribe information that the initiated could convert back into spoken form. Therefore 
no human utterance more than 5,500 years old exists in written form, across all cultures. 
But palaeontological evidence points pretty firmly to sapiens using the same complex 
language skills we have today for at least 75,000 years (with a reasonable case for going 
back to our origins c.200kya), and this being one of the drivers that actually separated 
our branch from at least six or seven other species of Homo with whom we then shared 
the world. Some palaeontologists have proposed that H naledi (c.300kya), H 
neanderthalensis (c.500kya) and even H heidelbergensis (c.600kya) were anatomically 
(if possibly not cognitively) suited to forms of speech. Given that all these species used 
fire, and that fire use demands sophisticated information exchange about collection or 
construction, ignition or transfer, maintenance, and safety, such forms of language in 
Homo species prior to sapiens is virtually certain, and relatively complex language 
more than plausible (Mithen; Fitch). 
 Even taking the lower figure for sapiens, we can count on there being 75,000 
years of human stories, memoirs, myths, songs, lullabies, epics, religions and jokes that 
were lost forever when the last human who knew them closed her mouth for the last 
time. In the 1920s the American Homer scholar Milman Parry proposed that the story 
of the Trojan Wars (c.1200 BCE) was passed down in song by generations of poet-
minstrels with remarkable memorization skills, with no mind for its publication or care 
for preserving the fidelity of what they inherited if they could improve it in some way. 
The act of inscribing The Iliad onto clay froze that organic, multi-authored song, 
refiguring it as something scholars took as definitive, as we might describe the 
authoritative text of Middlemarch. Modern English scholars should beware not to 
overlook the fact that stories began not as transmissions into the future for us to 
ruminate upon, but between contemporaries. 
 And let us remember also how astonishing and powerful the written word was 
for its early adopters. Societies with the power to write down their stories knew at once 
that it gave them power. Writing survives the death of its creator; it was literally 
understood as a form of immortality. For individuals, this might be (and often was) 
narcissistic, but for communities, inscribing formative myths elevates and preserves 
them (Greenblatt). There is a reason religious texts are reverentially referred to as  
script-ure, and that scripture by itself – the fact of being written down, in a world where 
only the most important things acquired that status – denoted authority. When God 
comes to Jeremiah to speak of the restoration of Israel, the first thing God tells Jeremiah 
is to write everything he says in a book (Jeremiah, 30:2). The New Testament is 
saturated with instances where “It is written” confers unique authority to a 
pronouncement (too many to enumerate, but extensively in Matthew 4, Luke 4, Romans 
2-4, 1 Corinthians 1-4). Religions worldwide hold the written documents of their 
foundation myths, the physical artefacts themselves, to be literally sacred. Jews keep 
all holy documents, however old and worn, in a safe place in the synagogue (a genizah) 
until they can be given a full Jewish burial. In Islam, it is haram to damage any 
document bearing text from the Koran. Sikhism elevated its scriptures to the status of 
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the eleventh and final living guru. This elevation of the authority of stories converted 
from ordinary spoken to permanently written form is a continuation of the bedazzled 
awe with which Bronze Age civilizations first regarded the magical new technology of 
inscription. Merely recalling these details should restore to us the colossal value writing 
has had in the development of our civilizations, and why its effects matter so much 
more than the mere transference of information.  
 What does this mean for literary studies? We should perhaps reflect on the value 
of language, story-telling and writing as instrumental in mobilizing well-organized 
societies in large numbers against neighbouring societies, to regard their own (but not 
others’) foundation myths as sacrosanct, and to crystallize gossip and personal 
information about individuals long past the point at which the Earth would have turned 
their bones to dust. We might counter that the study of history is dominated by the tribal 
violence and slavery that persist like a background hum behind human affairs; the study 
of art is contaminated by icons of religious adoration and wealthy patronage; science 
by technologies of destruction; and engineering by the infrastructures of invasion and 
subjugation. Of course, no-one disputes that these disciplines have taken more life-
affirming, exaptive, directions, which among the humanities have been relied upon by 
defenders such as Bate and Nussbaum. What of the civilizing effects, in a much larger 
sense than usual, of literary studies? Students of literature may be told that poetry is 
important and good for them, but one either likes or does not like poetry. All that 
unpicking and interpretation is a lot of work just to get to a message that could have 
been expressed with a lot less fuss and technical showing off. What is poetry for, but 
the vanity of those who write it, and the self-satisfaction of those who read it? 
 The answer for me lies in language’s socialization capabilities, in its smooth 
communicators by whom others want to be verbally groomed. Chimpanzees experience 
quite complex inner lives, and dogs, crows, elephants and dolphins all may have at 
minimum a rudimentary sense of empathy (de Waal). But just as humans exceed other 
species in language and tool use, we understand the experiences of others of our own 
by orders of magnitude. This, I propose, is thanks to poets, or those proto-poets who 
first mastered the subtleties of verbal grooming – who created poetry before they 
realized they were poets, just as Daniel Defoe wrote Robinson Crusoe without realizing 
it was a novel: Palaeolithic mothers cooing the pleasures of rhyme and rhythm to 
language-absent infants; ancestral storytellers accumulating peer approval (and very 
likely reproductive privileges) by demonstrating pleasurable inventiveness of language 
(Migliano et al); friends and lovers cementing emotional bonds, or leaders rousing 
warriors to defence or conquest. The study of such language means delving to the core 
of an emotional or psychological experience; filtering away, as a scientist would, 
whatever it is not, to uncover something essential, then ideally expressing it in some 
form which conveys to another the nature of that experience.  
 Chimps experience sadness, even grief, and can be remarkably good at 
comforting friends. But sadly for chimpanzees, the essence of sadness itself is 
inevitably broad. This can be so for humans, who may settle for “I’m fed up!” to express 
their situation. We all get fed up, so we understand what it means when someone says 
this. But consider William Wordsworth, unexpectedly noticing something amusing, 
turning to show his beloved infant daughter Catherine whom he knew it would delight, 
and then remembering that she was dead. And that he had already buried her.  
 
 Surprised by joy – impatient as the Wind 
 I turned to share the transport – Oh! with whom 
 But Thee, deep buried in the silent tomb, 
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 […] how could I forget thee?’ (204) 
 
This describes the nature of grief, in its agonizing complexity; Wordsworth’s 
bewilderment at memory’s cruelty, such that the intricate texture of the experience is 
transmitted to us. We know from those lines more than that Wordsworth was merely 
sad. The poet gives us something intimately personal against which to measure our own 
inner lives. When we find correspondence, when a poem reflects back something of 
ourselves, we realize the capabilities of language beyond its value as mere information 
exchange, or even gossip. Poets enable us to see how like one another we are 
experientially. Anatomists cannot do this. Only poets. This is what binds the community 
of humankind. This is the value of poetry. 
 I will conclude by touching on another idea, raised by Harvard psycholinguist 
Steven Pinker in his 2011 The Better Angels of our Nature. Habitual and routine 
violence were commonplace until the European Enlightenment, Pinker claims – all 
Elizabethan men carried knives, Christopher Marlowe took one in the forehead over an 
argument about a tavern bill, and blunted table knives were invented expressly to keep 
daggers away from the table, where they were prone to be used malevolently (see 
example of Marlowe, above). Despite everything in the contemporary news media, 
violence today is a minuscule fraction of the levels former societies regarded as normal, 
which Pinker attributes to a variety of factors, including friendly commerce, a decline 
in honour codes, a decline in utopian ideologies, formal marriage, an understanding of 
individual rights, feminism, and literacy. The novel is an eighteenth century invention 
largely driven by improved technologies in paper production, printing, binding and 
distribution, but also by widening literacy, which was crucial for extending the novel’s 
reach. A larger readership and vastly more well-crafted novels resulted in more readers 
encountering the problems, emotions and inner lives of other people – even if they were 
fictional – than they ever could in everyday conversation. Novels are detailed 
renderings of what it is to be another person. We measure them against ourselves and 
our own private concerns, and if done well the gap between our own being and those 
of others becomes marginally smaller. If dehumanizing others makes it easier to hate 
or harm them, then restoring their humanity, their likeness to us, makes it harder. This 
is a claim Pinker makes for the novel, which I rather approve (Pinker Better Angels of 
our Nature 175-77). Novels have made it harder for us to kill each other. What might 
always have seemed intuitively true about language’s (and literacy’s) essential roles in 
refining our civilizing tendencies takes a more concrete form as the story of its evolution 
unfolds. 
 Technology moves fast, and we are prone to forget very easily the stages 
between rudimentary and advanced forms, even over short time frames – a lament often 
heard from scientists, asked to justify their research by predicting its value for the 
future. Over the longer term, those intermittent stages can disappear almost entirely into 
the background noise. In this article, I have traced the long-term mutual 
interdependence between the interests of the sciences and the humanities, and how their 
interactions may, like the intermittent stages of scientific progress, easily be overlooked 
if our attention drifts. Specialist mathematical models designed by Australian physicist 
John O’Sullivan in the 1970s, to sharpen radio signals detected from disintegrating 
black holes, were never predicted to form the basis of WiFi technology – though that is 
where those models were eventually put to principal use. In like manner, and over a 
much longer term, the consequences of song, poetry and stories coevolving with, and 
facilitating, the technologies of human civilization could never have been predicted at 
its outset. Critical to the ScienceHumanities is an understanding of this mutually 
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supportive relationship. I have tried to demonstrate in this article that the analysis of 
language is crucial for an understanding of our present, technology-dominated society 
– which I think would be salutary for humanities scholars to recognize as well. 
Predictability is difficult to achieve, even in the sciences whose function it is to make 
reliable predictions. However, with demonstrable interdependence between the 
sciences and the humanities throughout both history and prehistory, continued 
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